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Introduction 
The Central Intelligence Agency has been burned badly in recent years. It was criticized, however 
unfairly, for failing to prevent the September 11 attacks. It suffered again for exaggerating 
Saddam Hussein’s WMD capabilities before the invasion of Iraq. Both events greatly undermined 
the CIA’s credibility and led to a massive reorganization of the intelligence community.  
Now the agency faces another critical issue over nuclear proliferation, as Iran progresses towards 
the ability to create weapons -grade material. How should it approach the Iranian problem? After 
losing so much prestige with policymakers, how can it possibly influence U.S. policy towards Iran?  
Assuming that Tehran is serious about developing a weapons program, the CIA can reestablish 
its role by helping policymakers prepare a coherent strategy before Iran goes nuclear. The CIA 
should address two puzzles that, once solved, will help deter Iran from proliferating nuclear 
materials and using its own arsenal coercively: First, it should attempt to isolate the unique 
characteristics of nuclear material produced at Iranian facilities, allowing forensic specialists to 
locate the origin of fissile material and making it impossible for Iran to remain an anonymous 
dealer. This will help deter Iran from proliferating to other states and terrorist groups. It will also 
deter Iran from using nuclear weapons because samples taken at the site of a detonation provide 
the same fingerprint. Second, the CIA should provide a detailed analysis of Israel’s ability to strike 
Iranian facilities. The White House has already warned Iran that Israel may launch a preventive 
strike against its conversion and reprocessing centers, but the difficulties in such an operation are 
substantial. Overstating the Israeli threat may cause Iran to redouble its efforts and increase the 
size of its program, potentially increasing the amount of fissile material available to terrorists.  
These technical puzzles are clearly relevant to U.S. policy on Iran, and they provide usable 
information that goes beyond the inherently vague predictions about Iranian intentions and its 
timeline for weapons production. Such ambiguous estimates are sometimes called “mysteries” 
because they are essentially unknowable. The answers to intelligence mysteries depend on the 
motives of foreign states. Discerning these motives with any certitude is extremely difficult, 
especially because foreign statesmen can always change their minds.[1] Does Iran intend to 
create nuclear weapons, as we suspect, or does it merely seek nuclear power generation, as it 
claims? The second question—when will the weapons be ready?—depends on the first. Both 
questions have given rise to a host of answers both inside and outside the community, as think 
tanks and media pundits compete with government analysts for the ear of decision makers. The 
CIA carries little cache on these kinds of political judgments after the Iraqi debacle. Moreover, its 
notorious lack of human intelligence in the region and dearth of language skills make it more 
dubious in the eyes of the policy community. 
But two factors work in favor of the CIA: 
1. First, the mystery about Iranian intentions is not the only relevant question for 
policymakers. As stated above, more technically concrete issues offer the CIA an 
opportunity to make a positive impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Iran. By focusing on 
soluble puzzles rather than insoluble mysteries, the agency can exploit its advantage in 
secret information instead of becoming just another prognosticator.  
2. Second, unlike the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush Administration currently 
has no clear policy preferences. The military is occupied in Iraq and the domestic costs of 
that operation make another preventive war unlikely. So far the Administration has been 
willing to tolerate European diplomatic initiatives without staking itself to any particular 
course. The absence of policy direction means that it has no need to rally public opinion, 
and therefore no need to politicize intelligence. Because this is the case, policymakers 
will be more open to different interpretations and less hostile to analysts who challenge 
the conventional wisdom.  
The Iraqi experience should serve as a cautionary tale for intelligence and policy officials alike. As 
a result of sloppy analysis and political pressure, the CIA made a number of serious blunders in 
its analysis of Iraqi WMD. The CIA director has since lost his position as principal advisor to the 
president, replaced by the new Director of National Intelligence. For their part, policymakers who 
justified regime change on the basis of weapons of mass destruction are now left to fight an 
increasingly lethal insurgency in a place where no such weapons existed. Public faith in the CIA 
and the White House has fallen precipitously, and allies look upon the United States with 
understandable wariness. This article looks at how the intelligence and policy communities can 
avoid the same fate in Iran. 
Iran’s Nuclear Trajectory 
Tehran’s long interest in nuclear research suggests that it is committed to acquiring a full fuel 
cycle; the recent revelations of large-scale research done in secret suggest that it also seeks a 
weapons program.  
Iran’s nuclear trajectory began in the 1950s, but accelerated in the late 1960s when it acquired a 
research reactor from the United States and became a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). In the 1970s the Shah moved aggressively on civilian nuclear energy, signing 
contracts for additional power plants and fuel with the United States, Germany, South Africa, and 
France. Iran was also widely suspected of launching a nuclear weapons program, although 
details remain sketchy. Both programs stalled with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, both because 
of a massive exodus of scientists from the country and because of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
declaration that indiscriminate nuclear weapons were not consistent with the tenets of Islam.[2] 
Interest in nuclear energy was renewed in the late 1980s as the Ayatollah became increasingly 
incapacitated. After signing nuclear cooperation agreements with China, Pakistan, and the Soviet 
Union, Iran focused its efforts on forging closer ties with Moscow. This effort culminated in 1992, 
when Russia expanded its existing cooperation treaty and agreed to construct a nuclear power 
plant at Bushehr.[3]  
During the 1990s Iran attempted to expand its circle of nuclear suppliers, but the United States 
successfully blocked agreements with Argentina and China. Washington’s ability to frustrate the 
delivery of conversion and enrichment facilities may have convinced Tehran to pursue a 
homegrown nuclear program. It increasingly sought dual-use components from western 
producers, a practice that ultimately led to extensive U.S. sanctions and pressure on European 
suppliers to halt delivery of sensitive technologies to Iran. Despite these efforts, Iran was able to 
continue progressing towards a full-fuel cycle. In 2002 an exiled opposition group announced that 
Iran had surreptitiously constructed a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water 
production plant at Arak. The head of the IAEA subsequently confirmed the impressive progress 
Iran had made at the previously unknown centrifuge plant. Later that year Iranian leaders 
announced their intention to rely on indigenous resources after discovering uranium ore in Yazd 
province.  
These developments led to a flurry of talks between Iran and European negotiators from France, 
Great Britain, and Germany. These were initially promising, and Iran twice agreed to suspend its 
centrifuge operations. But as of this writing, European-Iranian talks have broken down. Iran 
rejected a more comprehensive proposal that called for it to scale down its nuclear activities in 
return for trade and other benefits, and resumed uranium conversion at its facility in Isfahan. It 
has since produced more than seven tons of uranium hexafluoride gas, enough for one nuclear 
weapon after centrifuge enrichment.[4] Iran’s commitment to acquiring an indigenous full fuel 
cycle appears genuine, and it shows no signs of backing down even in the face of possible 
sanctions from the UN Security Council. There is probably is no way to sufficiently sweeten the 
deal for Tehran, no combination of sticks and carrots that will convince Iran to scuttle its nuclear 
ambitions. If this is the case, then the intelligence issues must shift from questions about whether 
Iran wants nuclear weapons to questions about what to do when they get them.[5] 
The Intelligence-Policy Context 
As I argue below, this shift should provide CIA an opportunity to reestablish itself in the foreign 
policy process. But the process of restoration will not be easy, owing both to the deflated status of 
the agency and the fundamental problems of intelligence-policy relations.  
Relations between intelligence agencies and policymakers are difficult even in the best of times. 
Friction is natural because intelligence can tacitly challenge the wisdom of policy decisions. 
Policymakers often voice concerns that intelligence is more interested in subverting policy 
initiatives than supporting them. Functional differences between the two communities compound 
the near-term political consequences of intelligence analysis. Intelligence idealizes objective 
judgment and a thorough examination of all relevant information. But time-starved policymakers 
cannot assess every perspective on every issue while building legislative and public support for 
policy initiatives. In addition, policymakers and intelligence professionals are cut from different 
cloth. Policymakers tend to be self-confident individuals who enter office which their own 
worldviews. They prefer current intelligence over long-term trends, brevity over length, and point 
predictions over conditional forecasts. Intelligence analysts, well aware that surprises are 
inevitable, tend to focus more on the uncertainty of international affairs.  
Unfortunately for the CIA, intelligence-policy relations have soured in the Bush White House. 
Since the Nixon Administration, conservative policymakers have routinely suspected that the CIA 
is a bastion of liberalism as well as a cumbersome and risk-averse bureaucracy. These 
suspicions were shared by several of President Bush’s advisors, some of whom battled the 
agency in the 1970s and 1980s over arms control issues and U.S. policy towards the Soviet 
Union. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom anonymous CIA officials complained that they were being 
pressured to bring their conclusions in line with policy preferences. Policymakers responded by 
accusing the CIA of a lack of creativity, and set up the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon to 
explore alternative hypotheses about Saddam’s WMD capabilities and links to international 
terrorism. Although the CIA’s final estimate strongly supported the case for war, it exaggerated 
Iraqi capabilities by entertaining a number of unsustainable assumptions. Ironically, these 
analytical errors undermined its credibility on nuclear issues. Continuing hostility was revealed 
last fall, when Administration supporters accused the CIA of conducting an “insurgency” against 
the White House over differing estimates about the violence in Iraq.[6]  
History does not bode well for the CIA: policymakers have a long memory of estimates gone 
wrong. When the agency fails in one case, as it did with the Iraqi WMD estimate, it is 
subsequently ignored. Moreover, failure causes intelligence officials to become gun shy about 
challenging misguided policy beliefs, and too ready to support policymakers’ preferences. For 
these reasons, the Iraqi fiasco will hamper the agency’s ability to make a positive impact on the 
Iranian case.[7]  
The good news is that the Bush Administration has not committed to a firm course on Iran, 
meaning that it is more likely to remain open to alternative analyses from the intelligence 
community. Bogged down in Iraq and struggling to retain domestic support, it cannot commit 
aggressively to the Iranian problem. In lieu of such a plan, the Administration has supported 
European efforts to negotiate a settlement. At the same time, it seeks a revision of the NPT to 
prevent other countries from mimicking Iran and approaching a nuclear weapons capability 
without technically violating its treaty obligations. “We must therefore close the loopholes,” the 
President announced, “that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build 
bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.”[8] The final element in the United States' 
strategy has been the tacit approval of an Israel strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, much like 
its 1981 bombing of an Iraqi facility. Last September Israel purchased 500 BLU-109 bunker-
buster bombs from the United States. The BLU-109, which can penetrate up to seven feet of 
reinforced concrete, is well suited for an attack on Iran’s underground facilities. The Vice 
President told a radio host in January that Israel “might well decide to act first” if diplomatic efforts 
failed.[9] In sum, the United States has sought arms control treaty revisions, while supporting 
European diplomacy and the quiet threat of Israeli preventive action. None of these positions are 
inflexible.  
The absence of a rigid policy means that there is no pressing need to rally public support. When 
policymakers commit to a course of action, they often justify their decisions by pointing to 
consensus agreement among the national security principals. This makes politicization likely. But 
because the Administration has not made such a commitment regarding Iranian nuclear activity, it 
is free to entertain analyses and recommendations from various parts of the national security 
establishment. Thus the CIA can still contribute to Iran policy despite its falling out with the Bush 
Administration—if it asks the right questions. 
Staying Ahead of the Policy Curve 
There are two obvious questions about Iran’s nuclear program. First, why does it seek a weapons 
capability? Does it want to deter rivals in a hostile neighborhood, or does it harbor aggressive 
designs? Alternately, does Iran seek to deliver fissile material to terrorist groups or export it to 
other states of concern? Second, how long will it take Iran to develop nuclear weapons? This 
question is partly a matter of technical competence and access to materials. But it is also a 
mystery about intentions. As Gary Sick explains:  
Whether or not Iran chooses to pursue the nuclear option to the weapons stage, and whether or 
not it is able to achieve its objectives, depends on a wealth of imponderables: the political 
evolution of the Islamic regime; the future price of oil…the willingness of outside powers to 
provide Iran a reprocessing facility; the state of U.S. relations with Iran and the other Persian Gulf 
states; even the outcome of the Arab-Israel peace process. Each of those factors, and probably 
many others, will affect the decision-making process in Tehran. Iran has started down the nuclear 
path. How far and how fast it moves down that path is no straight line projection. 
Trying to estimate weapons development timelines has long bedeviled U.S. intelligence. The CIA 
famously underestimated Soviet and Chinese nuclear progress during the Cold War, and its 
record with Iran is no better. In 1992, Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates estimated that 
Iran could have nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. The next DCI, James Woolsey, 
argued in 1993 that Iran could go nuclear within eight to ten years. But two years later the CIA 
joined a chorus of estimates that Iran had “shelved” its nuclear ambitions. This litany of changing 
forecasts is not meant to impugn the agency, but only to highlight the inherent ambiguity 
associated with intelligence mysteries. Estimates about foreign intentions must be made 
cautiously.[10]  
Still, these questions are obviously critical for U.S. policy on Iran, and the CIA should work hard to 
answer both. But it should not expect that its answer will hold pride of place in the White House, 
given the troubles of the last few years. It will be some time before the policy community looks 
first to the agency for estimates of foreign intentions. Nor should it focus all of its efforts on these 
issues. In fact, if it assumes that Iran will have nuclear weapons in the near- to medium-term, 
there are at least two other essential questions that the CIA can address that can immediately 
help the White House form a more coherent approach to Iran policy. These questions are puzzles, 
not mysteries. They both rely on technical analyses that can be performed without resorting to the 
dubious business of discerning foreign intentions. Answers to them will help policymakers 
prepare to deal with a nuclear-armed Iran.  
The first puzzle is about forensics: how well can the United States determine the source of illicit 
nuclear materials after they have been intercepted or after the detonation of a nuclear or 
radiological device? Many ongoing arms-control discussions deal with improving transparency to 
ease monitoring of existing stocks of nuclear-explosive material (NEM). But emerging nuclear 
powers have good reasons to keep their programs opaque. The deterrent value of a small 
arsenal increases if foreign states are kept in the dark about its exact size. A modest program can 
look disproportionately threatening if it is shrouded in mystery; witness the United States' 
concerns about North Korea. Retaining a shield of ambiguity also helps deter other states from 
considering preventive attack on nuclear facilities because success will be hard to measure. 
Israel’s successful bombing of an Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981 helped convince would-be nuclear 
states to disperse their programs geographically and take greater precautions against being 
discovered. Finally, emerging nuclear powers prefer to keep their research under wraps for fear 
of international sanctions and diplomatic opprobrium. This seems to have been the case with Iran. 
Efforts to improve transparency and multilateral treaties are laudable, but it is almost certain that 
some states will pursue weapons development while circumventing international nonproliferation 
efforts. The ominous implication is the possibility that a nuclear attack will occur from 
unaccounted stocks of NEM.  
The CIA has at least three ways of approaching the problem. First, it can improve collection on 
Iran by recruiting more human assets in country. The agency began reducing its presence in the 
region in the 1970s, in part because it had become the subject of public criticism for its covert 
actions abroad. The Iranian Revolution at the end of the decade was catastrophic for human 
intelligence (HUMINT). After enjoying close relations with the Shah, the Americans in Tehran 
suddenly found themselves the target of attack. Iranians stormed the U.S. embassy, leading to a 
massive withdrawal of CIA personnel working inside. The exodus of intelligence officers from Iran 
was repeated elsewhere, though less dramatically. The CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) 
became increasingly cautious in the field, the target of congressional overseers and investigative 
journalists. This trend continued into the 1990s, when accusations of support for brutal sources in 
Latin America led to new standards that sharply curtailed freedom of action in recruiting foreign 
agents. But the September 11 attacks produced a wave of support for removing such restrictions 
and, as one author put it, “letting the CIA be the CIA.”[ 11] Some restrictions were removed almost 
immediately. The agency is currently trying to increase the size of the DO, commensurate with 
the President’s announced desire for a 50% personnel increase, while looking for multilingual 
operatives who can work throughout the Middle East. None of this will be easy, of course, 
especially given the deep freeze in diplomatic relations. For a long while, recruiting 
knowledgeable Iranians will usually have to occur in third countries. In either case, increasing 
collection on the ground will improve the ability to track nuclear materials from the source.  
Second, it can bolster cooperative agreements with other intelligence services that aid the 
ongoing Proliferation Security Initiative. The Initiative is a loose set of principles for international 
interdiction efforts against smuggled WMD components and materials. While it does not carry 
treaty obligations, participants have so far been willing to join in a range of exercises and 
operations. Consolidating these early gains depends on their continued willingness to share 
information about trafficking activities with the United States. The CIA is well-placed to take the 
lead here because of its longstanding ties to foreign intelligence services.  
Finally, the CIA can assist with nuclear forensics, the emerging science that seeks to isolate the 
sources of discovered NEM by looking at the characteristics of the material itself. With respect to 
intelligence, the puzzle is to identify the unique signatures of NEM from Iranian facilities. 
Conversion and reprocessing differs from facility to facility, giving nuclear materials unique 
radioactive fingerprints. As researchers from the Institute for Transuranium Elements explain, 
“Nuclear material is generally of anthropogenic origin, i.e., the result of a production process. The 
nature of this production process is reflected in the elemental and isotopic composition of the 
material as well as in its microscopic and macroscopic appearance.”[12]  
Forensic scientists examine these traits in nuclear materials that have been seized from 
smugglers and, in theory, from residual samples after an explosion has taken place. Both 
approaches, however, rely on the acquisition of NEM from the source itself. The problem is akin 
to the use of DNA in courtroom trials: a suspect’s genetic information is meaningless as evidence 
unless it matches a sample taken from the crime scene. The CIA could make a substantial 
contribution if it is able to retrieve samples of nuclear material from Iran for matching analysis in 
the United States. A library of samples from various sites—acquired from the IAEA or from within 
Iran—would be a boon for nuclear forensic experts. Of course, this will require substantial efforts 
to rebuild HUMINT capabilities in the region. The agency can also use its Directorate of Science 
and Technology to research new technologies and analytical techniques associated with nuclear 
forensics, and task the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control center to act as 
a clearinghouse for similar efforts in the Department of Energy and national laboratories.  
Reliable forensics alone will not be enough to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but 
confidence in the ability to trace nuclear materials would be extremely useful to policymakers. 
The demonstrated ability to locate the source would give emerging nuclear powers pause before 
providing NEM to other states or terrorist organizations. Put another way, reliable nuclear 
forensics would provide a powerful deterrent to the use or transfer of nuclear weapons. This is 
especially important for Iran, which has long provided material support and assistance to 
Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. A sustained CIA effort along these lines will help 
policymakers encourage more responsible behavior.  
The second puzzle is about Israel: how easy would it be for Israel to successfully launch a 
preventive strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? Israel’s successful raid on Iraq in 1981 gives it 
credibility with respect to preventive action against regional nuclear aspirants, but the demands of 
a mission against Iran are much greater. Where Iraq presented an obvious target—the large, 
white-domed Osiraq reactor at al-Tuweitha—Iran’s facilities are dispersed throughout the 
country.[13] Key sites are underground and largely protected from bombing. Iran is also more 
distant; flight times and fuel requirements would present serious logistical challenges. In addition, 
regional security dynamics have changed in the two decades since the attack on Osiraq. In 1981, 
insecure Israeli leaders spoke in apocalyptic terms about the danger of a nuclear Iraq, taking 
seriously the prospects of a “second Holocaust.”[14] But Israel’s conventional superiority over its 
neighbors is no longer in doubt and its own nuclear capabilities are far more credible. Where 
Israel once had reason to fear the combined armies of Syria and Egypt, today Arab unity has 
bottomed out. And the removal of Saddam Hussein has isolated Syria and eliminated a 
longstanding threat on the eastern front.[15] This enviable security situation might further 
dissuade Israel from taking a chance on preventive action. If the United States wants to use the 
tacit threat of Israeli action as a coercive bargaining chip, it needs to know just how likely Israel 
would be of succeeding. The relative ease of the mission will help determine the effectiveness 
and credibility of the threat to unleash Israeli fighters on Iran.[16]  
Whether or not Israel has the capabilities to pull off a preventive strike, Iran may take such threats 
seriously. Its response may be consistent with the security dilemma: to enhance and harden its 
nascent nuclear capabilities. Such an effort would include the construction of additional facilities, 
which would make the preventive task harder; dispersing research and production centers over a 
wider geographic area, which would make operational intelligence less reliable; and hardening 
existing facilities. Iran has already taken steps to make some of its facilities invulnerable to air 
attack. While many of its research centers are above ground, the major enrichment site at Natanz 
is under alternating layers of dirt and concrete and surrounded by at least ten anti-aircraft 
batteries. Satellite imagery also shows that the entrance to the large halls that could house up to 
50,000 gas centrifuges is concealed by dummy buildings. These characteristics, some of which 
also appear at the Isfahan conversion plant, strongly suggest that Iran is fearful of an Osiraq-type 
attack. Military action against Iran will become more difficult if they are copied at future 
locations.[17] 
Policymakers need to carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits associated with coercive 
threats. The White House hopes that the threat of an Israeli strike will cause Iran to open itself 
more fully to international inspectors and turn back its nuclear clock. But if the security dilemma 
kicks in, such threats may push Iran to accelerate its efforts. Worse, the United States will not be 
able to make good on a threat that relies on the actions of another country. Given the risks 
involved, policymakers in Washington need to have a concrete understanding of how available 
capabilities will influence the decision making process in Tel Aviv. The CIA can add value to the 
military estimate by exploiting its access to sources in Israel. The agency has maintained 
cooperation with Israeli intelligence since the 1950s, even providing satellite imagery to Israeli 
planners before the Osiraq strike. It should exploit its contacts with military and intelligence 
personnel improve the assessment of Israeli capabilities.[18]  
Sellers and Buyers 
The ability to trace fissile materials and the estimate of Israeli capabilities are two areas in which 
the CIA can positively impact policy towards Iran. Focusing on these puzzles will provide lasting 
results. More robust nuclear forensics, aided by intelligence from the CIA, will enhance the 
credibly of deterrent threats. Armed with the ability to trace the origins of nuclear fuel, the United 
States can threaten to retaliate if any fissile material falls into the hands of terrorists. Similarly, the 
close analysis of Israeli capabilities will help policymakers avoid making specious warnings about 
a preventive strike.  
These products will be meaningless, however, if the agency does not adopt a more 
entrepreneurial attitude in its dealings with the policy community. Intelligence professionals have 
long been divided on the issue of how closely they should interact with policymakers. One school 
of thought holds that intelligence should remain clearly detached to avoid the potential for 
creeping political bias. On the other hand, intelligence that is too far removed from the policy 
world will become irrelevant to policymakers. Analysts in perfect isolation will spend their days 
churning out reports that are untimely and inconsequential. Both arguments have merit. 
Intelligence-policy relations are characterized by the ongoing struggle to balance the demands of 
analytical objectivity with the demands of policy relevance, and there is no strict rule about how to 
maintain the balance.  
But there are several reasons why the agency should presently move in the direction of relevance, 
not the least of which is the magnitude of the Iranian dilemma. Its development of WMD will 
profoundly reshape the regional balance of capabilities and cause serious concerns from 
Baghdad to Tel Aviv. American policymakers need to develop a strategy to allay these concerns 
while restraining Iran and guiding it along the path of a responsible nuclear power. Because the 
White House has not yet committed to a specific course, intelligence can contribute to the 
process without much risk of politicization. This opportunity will not last forever, however, and the 
recent election of a hard line conservative in Iran could convince the President to adopt a more 
coercive posture. Relations between policymakers and intelligence officials are already chilly, and 
the CIA runs the risk of becoming insignificant if it does not begin to anticipate legitimate policy 
needs. Moreover, the expanding marketplace for analysis means that the agency is no longer a 
unique source of information, secret or otherwise. The explosion of media outlets, internet sites, 
and think tanks have left policymakers with plenty of sources, and the CIA must strive to set itself 
apart from the pack.  
While intelligence officers must become better entrepreneurs, policymakers must become better 
consumers. Simply put, they need to incorporate intelligence without prejudice and get past their 
overwrought fears of subversion. Intelligence is always at risk of becoming irrelevant because 
policymakers are free to trust their own instincts. At the same time, intelligence agencies are 
often left holding the bag for policies gone awry. Congress punished the CIA for its covert 
activities in the 1960s and early 1970s, even though it was largely acting in support of policy 
initiatives. More recently it has come under fire for its inability to prevent the September 11 terror 
attacks. The 9/11 Commission criticized it for failing to develop an effective counterterrorism 
strategy before the attacks, even though it is not the role of intelligence to create national 
strategy.[19] As demonstrated by the ongoing reorganization of American intelligence, the CIA is 
at far greater bureaucratic risk than its policy counterparts. Accusations of sabotage ring hollow.  
This does not mean that policymakers should receive intelligence uncritically. Overly acceptant 
policymakers are as likely to make bad decisions as those who ignore intelligence completely. 
Invalid assumptions and mistaken beliefs go unchecked when policymakers are too confident in 
their intelligence advisors. At the same time, intelligence agencies that are too cozy with 
policymakers become personally vested in policy success and have strong incentives to avoid 
self-scrutiny. President Kennedy ordered the Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, largely because 
of his reverence for CIA chief Allen Dulles. Dulles had lobbied hard for the invasion without 
determining whether the political conditions in Cuba were actually conducive to a political uprising 
against the Castro government.[20] Instead of leading to productive intelligence-policy relations, 
excessive harmony leads to shared tunnel vision. Thus policymakers should always challenge 
intelligence when they have doubts about its findings. Analytical myopia is the wellspring of 
strategic disaster.  
But policymakers should question intelligence in good faith and without pressuring analysts to toe 
the policy line. The best consumers will interact with intelligence officers, not interrogate them. So 
far the Bush Administration has not performed well on either score. It indirectly politicized 
intelligence on Iraq by accepting unvetted claims about its WMD programs while ignoring analysts 
who disagreed.[21] Eventually the agency came around to the view that Saddam Hussein had a 
substantial biological weapons capability and was close to going nuclear. At this point the White 
House became a passive consumer, failing to follow up with basic questions about the analysis. 
Had it been more active, questioning some of the dubious sources that provided the most 
damning evidence of Iraqi actions, it might have been less confident in its claims. The United 
States lost international credibility as a result of its overheated rhetoric when it became clear the 
Iraq was not close to becoming a nuclear power. Given the need for international cooperation on 
proliferation issues, it cannot afford to make the same mistake again.  
By anticipating policy needs, the CIA can help formulate a sober and realistic strategy for a 
nuclear Iran. It can also begin the process of restoring its credibility with the White House and 
improving the overall quality of intelligence-policy relations. For this to occur, the CIA needs to 
answer critical puzzles ahead of time, and policymakers must be willing to listen.  
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